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Increased reporting requirements imposed by amendments to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) have provided an unprecedented opportunity to compare lending 
patterns across markets and lenders. Most of the initial work released using data for the 
first amended HMDA reporting year (1990) has focused on market-level racial differences 
in denial rates for home mortgages.  This study examines a different aspect: how and why 
individual institutions vary in their propensity to attract minority applicants and to approve 
applications from those customers. 
In a 1992  paper, the authors studied differences among individual lenders in the 
rates at which they originate minority and low-income loans, concluding that most of the 
variation can be attributed to differences in application rates rather than to differences in 
treatment. Here, the authors extend the previous analysis to examine the relationship 
between various measures of lender-market and financial performance and minority loan 
originations.  The investigation includes all housing credit loans--home purchase, 
refinancings, and home improvement loans--but is limited to minorities.  The authors first 
determine each lender's propensities to attract minority customers and to approve them for 
credit, and then conduct regressions to examine whether various measures of lender 
performance and structure can explain cross-lender variation in lending patterns. 
Remarkably little consistency is found in any of the residual patterns or across loan 
types, and lender structure and performance explain hardly any of the variations in minority 
loan applications or dispositions. The analysis reveals differences among lenders in their 
housing market activities, but the authors emphasize that the HMDA data do not contain 
enough relevant information about the loan applicants to draw any firm conclusions about 
the reasons behind the observed differences. 
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Increased reporting requirements imposed by  amendments to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1989 have provided an unprecedented opportunity to 
compare lending patterns across markets and lenders.  Most of  the initial work released 
using data for the first amended HMDA reporting year (1990) has focused on market- 
level racial differences in denial rates for home mortgages.  Our study examines a 
different aspect of  the situation, namely how and why individual institutions vary in their 
propensity to attract minority applicants and  to approve applications from those 
customers. 
This paper is the second in a series.  In the first (Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman 
[1992]), we used data from the 1990 HMDA sample of  home purchase mortgage loan 
applications to separate differences among individual lenders in the rates at which they 
originate minority and low-income loans into two components: (1) differences in the rate 
that they receive applications from minorities and low-income applicants; and (2) 
differences in their treatment of  minority and low-income applications.  We further 
decompose each of these sources of  variation into portions stemming from applicant and 
location characteristics and "pure lender" differences.  We conclude that most of  the 
variation across lenders in minority and low-income origination rates can be attributed to 
differences in application rates rather than to differences in treatment.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find that very little of the lender variation in either minority application 
rates or dispositions can be attributed to applicant economic characteristics, and while 
property location explains a nontrivial portion of  the cross-lender variance in application 
rates, most of  the lender variation is unexplained. 
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various measures of  lender-market and financial performance and minority loan 
originations.  We expand our investigation to include all housing credit loans -- home 
purchase, refinancings, and home improvement loans -- but limit the analysis to 
minorities. 
The analysis is sequenced in two steps.  First, we develop a procedure that 
enables us to determine, after controlling for the economic and locational characteristics 
of  its applicant pool, each lender's propensities to attract minority customers and to 
approve them for credit.  The national  1990 HMDA applicant-level data is partitioned 
according to its three types of  loan products.  For each loan type, we estimate two linear 
probability regressions:  (1) a model predicting an application's disposition, and (2) a 
model predicting the applicant's race.  Among the independent variables included in the 
regressions are applicant characteristics such as income, loan amount, income-to-loan 
amount, loan guarantee status, and fixed effects (separate intercepts) for each 
lenderlcensus tract combination.  The fixed effects in these six equations yield six lender 
residuals for each firm.  We also construct two overall lender residuals for each lender 
by aggregating the fixed effects associated with each of the lender's three loan products. 
In the second step of  the analysis, we use the six specific and two overall pure- 
lender residuals as dependent variables in regressions to examine whether various 
measures of  lender performance and structure can explain cross-lender variation in 
lending patterns.  Independent variables include the type of  institution (commercial 
bank, savings and loan, etc.), the number of  applications and market share of the lender, 
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Administration (FHA) or Department of  Veterans Affairs (VA), the percentage of  loans 
sold to federally guaranteed mortgage pools (FNMA, GNMA, or FHLMC), and, for a 
subset of  institutions, measures of  profitability and aggregate loan performance. 
Our analysis cannot explain very much of  the cross-lender or within-lender 
variations in applications or dispositions.  Remarkably little consistency is found in any of 
the residual patterns.  We detect virtually no correlation between institutions' treatment 
of  minority applicants (either absolutely or relative to nonminorities) and their 
propensity to attract minority applicants.  Patterns across the three loan types are also 
weak, with  correlations approximately 0.15 for attracting minority applicants and 0.05 for 
the acceptldenial decision.  Although overall patterns suggest that minority loan 
applicants are significantly more likely to be denied than nonminorities, it does not 
appear that this is caused by  a small subset of  institutions. 
A second principal conclusion emerges:  Lender structure and performance 
explain hardly any of  the variations in minority loan applications or dispositions. 
Institutions with higher profitability and lower capital ratios are marginally more likely to 
attract black applicants; however, they are also marginally more likely to deny them. 
Institutions with higher percentages of  loan originations sold to mortgage pools appear to 
attract fewer minorities; however, there is little impact on mortgage denials.  And, even 
after the FHAIVA status of  an individual borrower is taken into account, it appears that 
institutions receiving a higher percentage of  FHA/VA applications are marginally more 
likely to attract minorities, but also marginally more likely to deny their applications. 
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activities, we  do not attempt to draw conclusions regarding lender discrimination.  We 
emphasize in our discussion that the HMDA data do not contain enough relevant 
information about the loan applicants to make any firm judgments about the reasons for 
observed differences in lender activities.' 
The remainder of  this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we 
discuss the methodology used to isolate the pure lender effects by  controlling for 
applicant economic and locational characteristics.  In section 11, we provide a brief 
description of  the data and the procedures used to prepare data for this study. 
Univariate sample statistics are also presented.  In section 111,  we present the basic 
analytic results for the loan denial process.  Similar analysis is presented for the loan 
application process in section IV.  Finally, we  provide a summary and concluding 
remarks in section V. 
I.  Empirical Model 
The purpose of  this paper is to identify lender characteristics associated with 
particular minority lending patterns.  We seek to isolate true institutional differences; 
that is, differences that stem from specific strategies or procedures adopted by  lenders 
rather than from the markets or applicants they serve.  To identi& these lender effects, 
we must first control for application characteristics (such as loan size, applicant income, 
loan type [FHAIVA, conventional], and property location) that may be correlated with 
race.  We do this by  using a two-stage estimation procedure.  In the first stage, we 
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rates that cannot be explained by  characteristics of the application or location of  the 
property.  These lender residuals are then used as dependent variables in second-stage 
regressions relating these residuals to specific lender characteristics. 
In the first-stage regression, we use individual application data to estimate the 
following fixed-effects linear probability models for each of  three types of  loan 
applications:  home purchase, refinance, and home improvement: 
(I) DENIALimL =  pAIACi + pRIRACEi  + hlMSA, + pTITRACTT  + pLILENDERL  + 
el ~MTL, 
(2)  MINORITYimL =  &ACi  + pM2MS& + A2TRACTT  + pL2LENDERL  + e2imL, 
where DENIAL is coded one if  application i is denied and zero otherwise, and 
MINORITY is coded one if  applicant i is a minority (Native American, Black, or 
Hispanic) and zero otherwise.  AC is a vector of  application characteristics reported in 
the HMDA data.  AC includes gender, marital status, occupancy, income, loan amount, 
income-to-loan ratio, FHA or VA status, and interactions among these variables.  RACE 
is  one of  eight variables indicating the race of  the applicant or co-applicant; MSA, 
TRACT and LENDER are dummy variables indicating which metropolitan statistical 
area, census tract, and lender the application relates to; and e is a residual. 
The parameter estimates from equations (1) and (2), together with characteristics 
of  the applications received (AC, RACE, MSA, and TRACT), are used to predict 
minority application and minority denial rates for each lender.  Lender minority 
application and minority denial residuals are measured as the difference between the 
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application residual is then the lender's propensity to draw a higher or lower percentage 
of  minority applicants than is typical for lenders active in its market, given the 
characteristics of  the applications actually received by  the lender.  Similarly, the minority 
denial rate residual is the lender's propensity to deny a higher or lower percentage of 
minority applications than is typical for lenders active in its market (a similar residual 
can be formed for each lender's treatment of  nonminorities). 
In addition to constructing these two residuals for each of  the three types of  loans, 
we  also construct an overall minority application residual and an overall minority denial 
residual as weighted averages of the residuals for each type of  loan.  For the minority 
application residual, total loan applications were used to form the weights; for the 
minority denial residual, minority applications were used.  Thus, the first stage of the 
estimation yields eight separate lender residuals. 
In the second stage of  estimation, these eight lender residuals are regressed on 
various lender characteristics.  The general fonn of  the estimation is as follows: 
(3)  DENIAL RESIDUAIq,  = ywNONMINORITYLj + yWMARKET,j  + 
yFjFINANCELj  + uLj, 
(4)  APPLICATION RESIDUAIq,  = yWMARKET,j + yFjFINANC&,  + uLj, 
where for the L'~  lender, the subscript j indicates the type of residual or market (home 
purchase, refinance, home improvement, or overall).  MARKET is a vector of measures 
of  each lender's activity in the overall mortgage market, the minority mortgage market, 
and government-sponsored mortgage lending programs.  FINANCE is a vector of 
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are available for all lenders in our sample, while FINANCE variables are available only 
for a subset of  lenders.  In some instances, therefore, equation (3) is estimated only for 
the subset of  lenders for which the relevant data are available.  Our particular interest is 
in the relative treatment of  minority and nonminority applicants.  Therefore, we  also 
include each lender's nonminority denial rate residual, NONMINORITY, as a regressor 
in the minority denial residual equation (3). 
11.  Data 
Mortqa~e  Loan Application and Disposition Data 
Data on individual loan applications and dispositions for 1990, used in the 
first-stage estimation, are collected under the 1989 revisions to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA).  The amended HMDA data constitute one of  the most 
complete sets of  statistics on mortgage lending available in the United States.  Virtually 
all commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other mortgage 
lending institutions (primarily mortgage bankers) that have assets of  more than $10 
million and have an office in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) are required to 
report on each mortgage loan application acted upon by  the institution during the 
calendar year.  Lenders must report the loan amount, the census tract of  the property, 
whether the property is owner-occupied, the purpose of  the loan (home purchase, home 
improvement, or refinance), loan guarantee (conventional, FHA,  or VA), action taken by 
the lender (loan approved and originated, application approved but withdrawn, 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmapplication denied), the race and gender of  the loan applicant (and co-applicant, if any), 
and the income relied upon by  the lending institution in making the loan de~ision.~ 
In total, 9,333 financial institutions made HMDA filings for 1990 on 6,595,089 
loan applications.  Our analysis focuses on the 3,489,235 loan applications for 1-4 family 
properties in MSAs that were acted upon by  the lendex3 Of these loans, 1,984,688 
were home purchase loans; 716,595 were applications to refinance an existing mortgage 
loan; and 787,952 were applications for home improvement loans (generally second or 
third mortgages).  These applications were received by  8,745 separate institutions 
operating in 40,008 census tracts in all 340 of the nation's MSAs defined as of  1990.  For 
our analysis, we  define lenders at the MSA level; thus, an institution reporting 
applications for two different MSAs is treated as two different lenders.  There are 23,248 
such lenders in our samp~e.~ 
Descriptive statistics for the applications reported in the 1990 HMDA are given in 
table 1.  Statistics are listed separately for home purchase, refinance, and home 
improvement loan applications.  Clearly, housing credit applicants are a select sample of 
American households.  Household mean income ($63,071) is substantially higher than 
that reported for all households in the 1989 Survey of  Consumer Finances ($35,700).' 
The racial composition of the study sample also appears to differ from that of  all U.S. 
households.  Blacks constituted 6.9  percent of  the housing loan applicants, yet were 7.4 
percent of  the homeowners and headed 11.2 percent of  the households in 1990. 
Similarly, Asians, Native Americans, and others accounted for 5.6 percent of  the housing 
loan applicants but only 2.1 percent of the homeowners and 3.0 of the households. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmHispanics were more evenly represented:  6.6 percent of  the applicants, 4.1 percent of 
the homeowners, and 6.4 percent of  the  household^.^  It is also apparent that denial 
rates differ substantially by  race for all three types of  loans. 
Lender Characteristics Data 
Data on the market and financial characteristics of lenders are drawn from two 
sources: the 1990 HMDA data, described above, and Reports on Income and Condition 
(call reports) filed by  institutions with federal regulators on December 31, 1990.  To link 
the data from the different sources, we first identified the lender's regulatory agency 
using information reported in HMDA.  Once the regulatory agency was identified, the 
call reports were matched to HMDA lenders using institution names and MSA locations. 
Measures of  each lender's activity in the overall mortgage market, the minority 
mortgage market, and government-sponsored mortgage lending programs are constructed 
from the HMDA data.  As stated previously, these variables are defined at the lender- 
MSA level.  Variables reflecting the size of  the lender in the mortgage market include 
categorical measures of  the total number of  mortgage loan applications received by  the 
lender (less than 100, 100 to 500, more than 500); the lender's share of  all applications 
made in  the MSA; and three variables indicating the portion of  total applications to the 
lender, which are for either home purchases, refinancings, or home improvements.  The 
lender's participation in minority lending is measured by  a categorical variable indicating 
more than 100 minority applications, and by  the lender's share of  all minority 
applications in the MSA.  The lender's participation in federally sponsored mortgage 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmlending programs is measured by  the share of  each lender's home purchase mortgage 
applications received under the FHA or VA program, and by four variables indicating 
the share of  each lender's home purchase mortgage originations subsequently sold to 
FNMA, FHLMC, GNMA, and other institutions. 
Financial variables and type of  institution are taken from the call reports.  Six 
types of  institutions are identified using the call report data together with the name of 
the institution:  commercial banks, thrifts (savings and loans and mutual savings banks), 
credit unions, mortgage subsidiaries of  commercial banks, mortgage subsidiaries of 
thrifts, and independent mortgage banks.  Financial variables are measured for the whole 
institution, not lender-by-MSA, and are present for almost all commercial banks, thrifts, 
and credit unions (information on the parent institution is used for subsidiaries). 
However, we  lacked such information for independent mortgage banks, as they are not 
required to file call reports.  Financial variables used include the institution's 
capitalization rate (capitallassets), return on assets (earningslassets), real estate loans 
relative to total assets, non-real estate loans relative to assets, and deposits relative to 
assets.  Loan portfolio performance is measured by  the share of  total loans charged off 
in the previous year, the share of  real estate loans charged off, the share of  mortgage 
loans that were nonperforming (delinquent), and the share of  mortgage loans that were 
repossessed in the previous year. 
The distribution of applications and denial rates by  these lender characteristics is 
reported by  type of loan and race of applicant in table 2.  The means and standard 
deviations for variables used in the second-stage regression (equation [3]) are reported 
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111.  Lender Characteristics and Minority Denial Rates 
Parameter estimates for the first-stage regressions predicting the probability of 
denial (equation [I]) by  type of  loan are reported in appendix tables 1-3.  Similar 
regressions predicting the race of applicant (equation [2]) are reported in appendix tables 
4-6.7  As shown previously, these estimates can be used to form minority application and 
minority denial rate residuals for each lender.  In this section we focus on the minority 
denial rate equations; and in the section that follows, on the minority application rate 
equations. 
Second-stage regression results for minority denial rate residuals are shown in 
tables 4 and 5.'  In these estimations, we include the lender's nonminority denial rate as 
an independent (and highly significant) variable.  Thus, a positive coefficient on other 
variables means that an increase in the value of  the independent variable is associated 
with a rise in the lender's minority denial rate, holding other characteristics of the loan 
application and the denial rate for  nonminorities constant. 
Because all variables were not available for all lenders, several samples were 
used.  All institutions were used in regressions excluding financial variables; separate 
regressions were run for credit unions, thrifts, and commercial banks (including 
subsidiaries) for which financial variables were available.  In addition, separate 
regressions were run for home purchase, refinance, and home improvement loans, and 
for a sample restricted to large institutions (more than 100 total loan applications).  In 
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from a minority during 1990. 
In evaluating the regression results, it may be useful to organize the discussion 
around conjectures with respect to lender behavior that have been raised in the debate 
over potential mortgage lending bias. 
Lender Consistency 
Much of  the judicial and regulatory effort in the area of  mortgage lending 
oversight has been focused on identifying individual cases of  lender bias.  If  overall 
patterns of  differential treatment of minority and nonminority mortgage applicants 
stemmed from a few lenders with discriminatory practices or cultures, one would expect 
to see consistency in individual lender behavior across loan products.  As shown in table 
6, there does not appear to be strong evidence that is the case.  This table shows the 
correlations of  the absolute minority and relative minority (minority minus nonminority) 
denial-rate residuals across the three loan products. 
Correlations among the absolute minority denial-rate residuals across the three 
loan products range from 0.153 to 0.230.  However, most of this correlation appears to 
stem from the institution's overall "toughness"; the correlations among the relative 
minority denial-rate residuals range only from 0.046 to 0.064.  This lack of persistence is 
evident if  we examine the 2,814 lenders that received minority applications for all three 
loan types.  Of  these, 403 had relative minority denial rates that were less than predicted 
(negative residuals) for all three loan types.  However, if  there were no persistence 
across loan types, by  chance we would predict that 305 of these lenders would have 
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minority denial rates than predicted for all three loan products, versus the 400 predicted 
by  chance alone.  To put this in perspective, if  lender behavior were perfectly correlated 
across loan products, we would predict that 100 percent of  the lenders would show 
consistent behavior.  If  behavior were completely unrelated across loan types, by  chance 
alone, we would predict that 25 percent would show consistency.  The actual figure, 32 
percent, is much closer to the random prediction than that of  perfect lender consistency. 
Economies of  Scale 
It has often been argued (see ICF [1991]) that most underwriting guidelines are 
developed based  on experience with standard, nonminority applications.  Consequently, 
applications from minorities are more likely to require verification and processing efforts 
outside the lender's normal experience, and thus be more costly.  If  so, this might lead to 
higher lender denial rates for minorities either because lenders lack the expertise to 
evaluate them properly, or because lenders choose not to expend the extra effort. 
If  these arguments were true, then we would expect minority denial rates to be 
lower for lenders receiving more minority applications, since these lenders would have 
more of  an incentive to invest in  the expertise required to evaluate minority applications. 
Evidence on this score is mixed.  In our results for all institutions (column 1 of  table 4), 
we  find no significant relationship between a lender's minority denial rate and either the 
absolute number of  minority applications it processes or its market share (though the 
point estimates are negative).  On the other hand, in differentiating among large lenders 
(column 7 of  table 5), we  find a significantly lower minority denial rate for lenders 
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commonly asked questions appear in the row labeled "Commercial Bank Types" at the 
bottom of  table 4.  We find a significantly lower minority denial rate for minority-owned 
institutions (column 7 of table 4), which presumably have particular expertise in dealing 
with minorities.  On the other hand, banks that are part of a bank holding company, and 
thus apt to be more specialized, are significantly more likely to reject minority applicants 
than would be predicted. 
Secondary Mortgage Market 
Several conjectures have been raised about the impact of the secondary mortgage 
market on minority applicants.  It has been argued (see ICF [1991]) that the need to sell, 
or potentially sell, a loan in the secondary market has led to adherence to more rigid, 
standardized underwriting standards.  Minorities, it has been argued, may be hurt by  this 
practice because minority loan applicants (and neighborhoods) tend to be more 
idiosyncratic and less likely to conform to standard "rules."  If  this is true, it should mean 
that large lenders, with potentially large diversified portfolios of  their own and less need 
to sell, should bear less risk in making nonconformable loans.  Thus, we might expect to 
see lower minority denial rates among such lenders.  However, we generally find no 
relationship between the number of  applications processed by  a lender and the lender's 
minority denial rate.  The exceptions are credit unions, and in differentiating among 
large lenders.  However, in both of  these cases, the minority denial rate is significantly 
higher for lenders processing a large share of  the mortgage applications in their MSA. 
It is also possible to examine the direct evidence of participation in the secondary 
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portions of  their loans in the secondary market have higher minority denial rates.  In 
fact, the estimates in table 4 indicate that lenders who sell large portions of  their loans in 
this market are in general less like&, not more likely, to deny minority applications. 
Thus, any negative impact on minorities resulting from more rigid underwriting standards 
imposed by  the secondary market appears to have been more than offset by more 
favorable treatment resulting from the use of  objective standards or in originators 
perceiving that risk can be passed on. 
FHA/VA Loan Programs 
The federally guaranteed loan programs, FHA and VA,  are quite prominent in 
the mortgage lending bias literature.  On the one hand, minority borrowers have 
traditionally favored FHA/VA loans, and FHA/VA lenders should have more 
experience in dealing with minorities, and thus give them more favorable treatment.  On 
the other hand, lenders have argued that FHA and VA originators bear the risk of post- 
default recourse for nonconforming loans, which might harm minorities who are less 
likely to have conformable applications. 
Again, the evidence is mixed.  Lenders with a large share of FHA/VA loans tend 
to deny minority applicants at a higher rate than would be expected based on their 
nonminority denial rate and other application characteristics, including whether a specific 
application is for an FHA/VA loan.  Though this effect is significant for FHA  loans, the 
effect is quite small: a 10-percentage-point increase in FHA loans as a share of  total 
home purchase loans increases the minority denial rate by  less than half of  1 percent; 
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loans), the effect is more than offset by  the lower minority denial rates associated with 
resale to GNMA. 
On the other hand, the direct effects of  FHA/VA loans on denial rates, as 
reported in appendix tables 1-3, go in the opposite direction.  Focusing on home 
purchase loans, which comprise most FHA/VA loans, the estimates in appendix table 1 
indicate that FHA/VA loans are less likely to be denied than conventional loans, and 
that this effect is of  the same order of  magnitude for all racial groups (the probability of 
denial is reduced by  2 percent for blacks, 4 percent for Hispanics, and 3 percent for 
whites and Asians).  This implies that the absolute denial rate for minorities would be 
lower, but that relative rates would be unaffected. 
A number of  conjectures have been raised about the relationship between 
minority applicant treatment and loan performance (see Becker [1993]).  Several 
apparently contradictory arguments have been made.  One is that if  lenders arbitrarily 
deny black loan applicants because they have a "taste" for discrimination, then in a 
competitive environment, such lenders would "pay" for these practices by  showing lower 
profits and higher loan losses.  On the other hand, some argue that if race is correlated 
with performance (perhaps because minorities suffer discrimination in other markets), 
then lenders who use race in underwriting (albeit illegally), and consequently deny a 
higher percentage of  minority applicants, will show higher-than-average profits. 
We  find mixed results with respect to performance.  Higher minority denial rates 
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table 4), but also with higher nonperforming mortgage rates for thrifts.  Moreover, most 
other measures of  performance appear to be unrelated to the minority denial rates. 
IV.  Lender Characteristics and Minority Application Rates 
In this section, we  examine the relationship between lender characteristics and 
minority application rates.  The parameter estimates are reported in tables 7 and 8. 
Since the dependent variables in these regressions are the differences between the actual 
and predicted application rates for each lender, a positive coefficient indicates that the 
lender characteristic is associated with disproportionately large minority application rates, 
controlling for the characteristics of  the specific applications received by  the lender, such 
as loan size, applicant income, FHA/VA loans, and property location. 
As was the case with the minority denial-rate regressions, it may be useful to 
organize our discussion of  the application rate equations around several conjectures that 
have been raised in the lending bias literature. 
Lender Consistency 
Table 9 presents the correlations between the minority application rate residuals 
for the three loan products and the correlations of  these residuals with those of  the 
denial rate equations.  Clearly, there is evidence of  more persistence among the three 
loan products in the application process than in the denial equations.  Correlations 
among the application rate residuals range from 0.148 to 0.188.  This conclusion is 
reinforced by  an examination of  the patterns of  the lenders engaged in all three markets. 
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all three loan types, compared with an expected number of  456, and 456 have application 
rates lower than predicted for all three loan types, compared with an expected number of 
263 lenders.  Overall, the 41 percent of  lenders showing a persistent pattern is 
considerably larger than the 25 percent we would expect by  chance, but much lower than 
the 100 percent implied by  perfect correlation. 
It is also interesting to examine the relationship between the minority application 
residuals and the absolute and relative minority denial-rate residuals.  Overall, those 
institutions with higher-than-expected minority applications are associated with 
higher-than-expected absolute denial rates, but lower-than-expected relative denial rates. 
In all cases, however, the correlations are small (the largest is .041).  In some ways this is 
a surprising result, because it suggests that minority applicants do not seem to be 
attracted to institutions that treat them better on either an absolute or a relative basis. 
The overall levels of  fit shown in tables 7 and 8 reflect a general lack of 
consistency and persistence.  The R2.s reported (ranging from 0.02  to 0.14) indicate that 
our lender characteristics explain very little of  the cross-lender differences in minority 
application rates.  Certain kinds of  lenders (particularly mortgage banks) tend to process 
disproportionately large numbers of  minority applications, even after controlling for 
cross-lender differences in propensities to process FHA/VA and low-income loan 
applications.  Interestingly, both commercial banks and thrifts tend to process a 
disproportionately large share of  their minority applications through their mortgage 
subsidiaries.  We also find that banks that are part of  a bank holding company process 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmdisproportionately few minority applications, and minority-owned banks process 
disproportionately large numbers of minority applications. 
Secondarv Market and FHAIVA Loans 
The presence of  a strong secondary market has been raised with respect to the 
service of  the minority community as well as with the treatment of minority applicants. 
The argument has been made that small "niche" lenders can serve the minority 
community only if  they can sell loans to a diversified secondary market.  Thus, while any 
large lenders with more efficient marketing and processing operations might attract their 
share of  minority applications, the only small institutions that could do so would be those 
engaged primarily in originating for the secondary market.  Indeed, we find that large 
institutions do process a disproportionate share of  minority applications relative to 
smaller lenders (approximately 92 percent of  minority applications compared with 89 
percent of  nonminority, as shown in table 2).  However, this difference appears to be 
related  to the racial composition of  the geographic and product markets served by  these 
different-sized lenders.  After controlling for differences in loan applications such as 
income, loan size, FHA/VA, and property location, we find that large lenders process 
disproportionately fewer minority applications than do small lenders (column 1  of  table 
7).  Only among the largest lenders do we find that increases in market share are 
associated with a rise in minority application rates. 
On the other hand, lenders active in FHA/VA lending tend to receive a 
disproportionately large share of  minority applications, even aper controlling for  whether 
or not a specijic application is for  an FHA/VA loan.  That is, lenders active in FHA/VA 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmlending tend to attract more minority applications for conventional loans.  While 
significant, the effect on minority application rates is quite small:  a 10 percentage-point 
increase in FHA lending increases minority application rates by  less than one-sixth of  a 
percentage point.  Also, recall that these lenders have higher minority denial rates.  For 
home purchase applications, these two effects cancel out, and the net effect is that 
increases in the percent of  FHA lending have no effect on the number of  minority loans 
that are actually originated by  the lender. 
Conversely, lenders selling large portions of  their loans in the secondary market 
process disproportionately  fewer minority applications than do lenders who hold these 
loans in their own portfolios.  Again, it is important to emphasize that this is after 
controlling for characteristics of  the loan itself, which may increase the likelihood that it 
is sold, and controlling for other lender characteristics.  In general, compared with 
nonminority applications, more minority applications are processed by  lenders who sell 
more than one-third of  the loans they originate. 
Financial Performance 
We find some interesting patterns of  minority lending related to the financial 
variables.  For commercial bank and thrift lenders, increases in either real estate or non- 
real estate loans as a share of  their total assets are associated with larger minority 
application rates.  These lenders also were found to have disproportionately low minority 
denial rates, indicating that institutions that focus on lending originate disproportionately 
large numbers of  minority mortgage loans.  We  also determine that highly capitalized 
lenders (viewed as an indication that the institution is relatively conservative) have 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmdisproportionately low minority application rates--but recall that there was no evidence 
that these lenders deny a disproportionately large share of their minority applicants. 
Most interestingly, we  find that commercial banks processing a 
larger-than-expected number of  minorities have higher-than-expected earnings.  However, 
such banks are associated with higher loan charge-off rates.  Although thrifts show no 
relationship between minority applications and overall earnings, higher-than-predicted 
minority application rates are associated with  higher-than-predicted rates of 
nonperforming or repossessed mortgages. 
V.  Summary and Conclusion 
Increased reporting requirements imposed by  amendments to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) in  1989 have provided an unprecedented opportunity to 
compare lending patterns across markets and lenders.  Most of  the initial work released 
using data for the first HMDA reporting year (1990) has focused on market-level racial 
differences in denial rates for home mortgages.  Our study examines a different aspect of 
the situation:  how and why  individual institutions vary in their propensity to attract 
minority applicants and to approve applications from those customers. 
In this study, we  extend the previous analysis to examine the relationship between 
various measures of  lender-market and financial performance and minority loan 
originations.  We  expand our investigation to include all housing credit loans -- home 
purchase, refinancings, and home improvement loans -- but limit the analysis to 
minorities.  First, we develop a procedure that enables us to determine, after controlling 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmfor the economic and locational characteristics of  its applicant pool, each lender's 
propensities to attract minority customers and to approve them for credit.  We estimate 
a fixed-effects model and obtain six lender residuals for each firm. We also construct 
two  overall lender residuals for each lender by  aggregating the fixed effects associated 
with each of  their three loan products. 
In the second step of  the analysis, we use the six specific and two overall pure- 
lender residuals as dependent variables in regressions to determine whether various 
measures of  lender performance and structure can explain either cross-lender or within- 
lender variations in lender patterns. 
Our analysis cannot explain very much of  the cross-lender or within-lender 
variations in applications or dispositions.  We find remarkably little consistency in any of 
the residual patterns.  There is virtually no correlation between institutions' treatment of 
minority applicants (either absolutely or relative to minorities) and their propensity to 
attract minority applicants.  Patterns across the three loan types are also weak, with only 
sparse evidence of  consistency in lender behavior.  Although overall patterns suggest 
minority loan applicants are significantly more likely to be denied than nonminorities, it 
does not appear that this is caused by  a small subset of  institutions.  A second principal 
conclusion emerges:  Lender structure and performance explain hardly any of  the 
variations in minority loan applications or dispositions. 
Although our analysis reveals differences among lenders in their housing market 
activities, we do not attempt to make judgments about lender discrimination.  We 
emphasize in our discussion that the HMDA data do not contain enough relevant 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfminformation about the loan applicants to draw any firm conclusions regarding the reasons 
for observed differences in lender activities. 
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1. These data may be useful in conjunction with other data, such as those collected from 
regulatory audits.  Regulators may  find  the information particularly helpful in signaling 
potential problem  lenders.  For a thorough discussion of  both the issues and  data, see 
Canner and Smith (1991, 1992) and Ganvood and Smith (1993). 
2.  Institutions with assets of less than $30 million were not required to report race, income, 
and gender for loan applicants.  In addition, the HMDA filings contained many errors and 
inconsistencies even after extensive editing by the receiving agencies. We dealt with missing 
and implausible data using a "hot deck imputation procedure similar to that used by  the 
U.S.  Census Bureau.  Applications with  missing  or implausible data were  statistically 
matched to applications for the same type of loan in the same census tract that came closest 
to them in reported characteristics (race, loan action, income, and loan amount).  Missing 
values were filled in using the variable value of  the matched observation.  Overall, income 
was imputed for 4.9  percent, loan amount for 1.5 percent, gender for 4.0 percent, and race 
for 5.6 percent of  the study sample applications. 
3.  Applications were omitted from our sample for the following reasons:  loans purchased 
from other institutions (1,137,741) because they did not require an action by the reporting 
lender;  applications for properties outside the MSAs in which the lender had an office 
(1,523,429 loans) because of inconsistent reporting requirements; applications  for multifamily 
homes and those that never reached the stage of  lender action because they were either 
withdrawn by the applicant or closed for incompleteness (444,684). 
4.  The 8,745 financial institutions filing 1990 HMDA reports that had at least one loan in 
the study sample operated in an average of  2.7  MSAs.  This translated into 23,248 study 
lenders when lenders were defined at the MSA level. 
5. See Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992) for a description of  the Survey of  Consumer 
Finances.  In the HMDA data, household income may be slightly understated, as it reflects 
only the portion of  an applicant's income needed for mortgage qualification. 
6.  The percent  Hispanic in the HMDA sample is slightly higher than the overall U.S. 
population, due in part to the inclusion of  Puerto Rico, and the percent black is slightly 
lower.  U.S. figures are taken from the whole 1990 Census, which may differ somewhat from 
the coverage of  the study sample, in that rural areas are included. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfm7.  These  equations were  actually estimated  in  two  steps.  In  the  first  step, individual 
application characteristics were used with separate intercepts for each lender-census tract 
combination (a single component fixed effect).  The home purchase equation had 607,631 
such intercepts; the refinance  equation,  326,535; and the  home improvement  equation, 
267,158.  In the second step, an iterative procedure, equivalent to regressing the fied-effects 
intercepts against the MSA, census tract,  and lender dummies, was used  to identify the 
MSA, tract, and lender effects.  By  construction, the MSA effects were normalized to have 
overall  sample  means  of  zero,  and  within  each  MSA,  lender  and  tract  means  were 
normalized to zero.  In cases where lender and tract effects were not identified (a lender 
was the only lender in a tract and did all of its business there), the effect was assigned to 
the tract.  The minority application residuals used in this paper are taken directly from these 
estimated lender effects.  Since we wanted denial rate residuals separately for minorities and 
nonminorities, the other elements of the model (AC, RACE, MSA, and TRACT) were used 
to form a predicted denial rate for each applicant.  The minority denial rate residual for 
each lender was formed by averaging the residuals from this prediction over each lender's 
minority applicants.  The nonminority lender residual was formed similarly. We also should 
note that the reported standard errors in the appendix tables are those from a standard 
regression program.  These may be biased due to heteroskedasticity stemming from the fact 
that the underlying model is a linear probability model. 
8. The reported regressions here, and in tables 7 and 8, are unweighted with lender as the 
unit of  observation.  Standard errors are those reported in a standard regression package, 
and thus are unadjusted for heteroskedasticity or for the fact that the dependent variable 
is a sample residual formed from another estimation.  Weighted regressions were also run, 
with similar substantive conclusions. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmREFERENCES 
Avery, Robert B.,  Patricia E. Beeson, and Mark S. Sniderrnan. 1992.  "Cross-Lender 
Variation in Home Mortgage Lending."  Working Paper 9219, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland (December). 
Becker, Gary S.  1993.  "The Evidence against Banks Doesn't Prove Bias."  Business Week 
(April 19), p.  18. 
Canner, Glenn B., and Delores S. Smith. 1991.  "Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: 
Expanded Data on Residential Lending."  Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.  77 (November), 
pp. 859-881. 
. 1992.  "Expanded HMDA Data on Residential Lending: One Year 
Later."  Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 78 (November), pp. 801-824. 
Garwood, Griffith L., and Delores S. Smith. 1993.  "Community Reinvtstment Act: 
Evolution and Current Issues."  Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.  79 (April), pp. 251-267. 
ICF, Incorporated. 1991.  "The Secondary Market and Community Lending through 
Lenders' Eyes," Paper prepared for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(February). 
Kennickell, Arthur, and Janice Shack-Marquez. 1992.  "Changes in Family Finances from 
1983 to 1989: Evidence from the Survey of  Consumer Finances."  Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, vol. 78 (January), pp.  1-18. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 1:  Characteristics  of Mortgage Applications, National Sample, 1990  HMDA 
Home Purchase  Refice  Home lmarovement 
P-t  P-t  Denial  Percent Percent Denial  Percent Percent Denial 
Sample LAWIS Rate  Sample LAWIS Rate  Sample Lod  Rate 
Race of Applicant 
Native American 





Race of Cwpplicant 
No  Cwapplicant 
Same Race as  Applicant 
Different Race than Applicant 
Gender 
Male Applicant, Fde  Co-applicant 
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant 
Single Male Applicant 








Loan Aceepted and Withdrawn 
Loan Originated 
Loan Kept by Originator (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to FNMA (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to GNMA (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to FHLMC (% of originations) 
Loan Sold Elsewhere (% of originations) 
Reasons for Denial (of Lwns Den 








Mortgage Insurance Denied 
Other 
Memo lrems: 
Median Income ($1,000~) 
Median Loan Request (S 1,000s) 
Number of Loans 
I  Up to Uuee reasons for denial could be given, and answers  were voluntary.  Each ategory gives the percent of all  denials that gave that reason as 
onc or the Uuee. 
SOURCE  FOR ALL  TABLES:  AuthorS. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 2:  Distribution of Mortgage Applications and Lhid Rates by I.&  ~hara~teristiesl.  1990 
- - - - -  -  - 
Home Purchase  efmce 
Nonminori 
Sample  Rate  Sample  Rate  Sample  Rate  Sample  Rate  Sample  Rate  Sample  Rate 
Type of  Inslitution 
Commercial Banks  23.1%  16.8%  18.9%  31.7%  30.Wo  17.5%  22.4%  30.5%  70.1%  22.2%  74.3%  37.9% 
Thrift Institutions  33.5  11.9  35.1  21.8  45.3  16.2  56.0  25.3  20.0  23.6  16.6  43.4 
Credit Unions  1.1  10.0  0.7  21.8  2.8  10.0  1.9  19.2  7.7  8.5  6.9  16.1 
Bank  Subsidiaries  19.8  14.7  18.7  26.0  9.2  18.7  5.9  29.6  1.1  22.0  0.9  31.3 
Thrift Subsidiaries  7.6  12.8  8.2  23.5  4.6  21.2  5.5  27.9  0.4  25.1  0.5  31.3 
Other MorIgageBanks  14.9  11.2  18.3  20.5  8.1  19.0  8.3  26.2  0.7  25.9  0.8  31.2 
Size of  Institution 
c  100 Applications  11.1  15.6  8.0  26.2  12.2  16.5  7.6  26.8  13.1  15.2  10.0  28.2 
100-500 Applications  37.6  13.8  29.4  25.6  32.9  15.8  18.7  26.9  30.6  17.0  23.4  31.0 
> 500 Applications  51.3  12.8  62.6  23.9  34.8  18.0  73.6  27.3  56.2  25.1  66.7  40.4 
Marker (MSA) Sham of  Institutim 
Less than  1 Percent  21.1  14.4  19.0  24.3  25.8  17.9  21.3  27.3  20.7  18.5  19.3  31.9 
1-5 Percent  43.5  12.9  43.0  24.4  39.4  16.6  40.5  26.2  33.3  21.7  33.6  37.7 
More than 5 Percent  35.4  13.7  37.9  25.2  34.8  17.2  38.2  28.1  46.0  22.7  47.2  37.7 
She of  MSA 
c  25,000 Applications  51.5  14.1  39.5  26.4  42.0  15.7  22.3  27.9  50.9  17.7  39.1  33.3 
>25,0OOApplications  48.5  12.8  60.5  23.0  58.0  18.1  77.7  27.8  49.1  25.1  60.9  39.6 
FHMA  (First Mortgage  AppIimtions) 
Less than  15 Percent  58.4  15.3  53.6  26.0  84.2  17.4  88.4  27.1  85.2  21.3  85.7  36.6 
15-50 Percent  20.4  11.0  17.6  23.3  10.9  14.6  6.5  26.6  11.8  24.2  9.9  38.9 
More than 50 Percent  21.2  11.0  28.8  22.8  4.8  17.3  5.1  28.8  3.0  17.6  4.4  29.3 
Firsr ~ortgages  soldl 
Less than 33 Percent  35.5  15.1  30.9  27.0  51.9  17.1  45.3  28.3  68.6  21.3  71.3  37.1 
33-57 Percent  16.6  13.6  19.4  24.5  19.0  17.8  22.8  28.0  18.1  20.7  17.2  34.7 
More than 67 Percent  47.9  12.3  49.8  23.1  29.1  16.8  32.0  24.7  13.3  23.3  11.5  37.3 
Rerlrm on Assers (~arnings)~ 
Loss  23.6  13.3  26.6  24.3  24.1  17.6  26.2  26.9  15.2  24.6  14.8  41.1 
0-3  Percent  37.6  12.5  40.3  23.5  38.0  16.7  40.0  26.6  24.8  25.2  26.0  41.8 
More  than .5 Percent  38.8  16.3  33.2  29.6  37.9  17.0  33.7  28.4  60.1  19.3  59.2  33.7 
Capitalizntion  (Copital to Assets) 
4 
Less than 6 percent  58.0  15.2  67.6  26.5  56.2  18.5  70.2  28.3  52.9  24.5  59.0  39.2 
More than 6 Percent  42.0  12.6  32.4  25.2  43.8  14.9  29.8  25.6  47.1  18.1  41.0  33.9 
Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.  :  Native Americans, blacks, and Hispanics. 
Based  on  loans both originated and sold during 1990. 
Earnings and capitalization data are not available for any independent mome  banks end some  other institutions. 
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